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management and function, but it would seem that recognition of the
possibility of being subjected to punitive damages would lead to better
selection, training and control of employees.3 4 The deterrent effect
of punitive damages could be realized in regard to a municipal corpor-
ation as well as a private corporation. With the continuing growth of
municipal corporations courts may accept this reasoning and award
punitive damages against municipalities in an effort to prevent just
such deplorable conduct as occurred in the Fisher case.
CHARLES GLIDDEN JOHNSON
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR POLICE DOG BITES
Many cities use dogs to aid the police in preventing crime
and apprehending criminals. Occasionally one of these dogs bites an
innocent citizen; this raises the problem of the remedies available
to the injured person and of the liability of the municipality. Since
the dog is owned by a municipal corporation, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity presents a formidable hurdle.
In the recent case of Harbin v. District of Columbia,2 a case of
first impression in the District of Columbia, a canine patrol car was
sent to investigate a suspected housebreaking in downtown Washing-
ton. Upon arrival, the officer was informed that the felon was escaping
through a nearby alley and he commanded the police dog to arrest
the suspect. In apparent confusion, the dog instead attacked and
bit Harbin, who was innocently sitting on a step eating his lunch.
In his complaint, Harbin alleged the liability of the District of
Columbia on three grounds: (i) failing to provide proper supervision
'%A case dealing with improper police conduct was People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.
2d 434, 282 P.2d 95 (1955), involving the illegal seizure of evidence and its use
at a subsequent trial. The dissenting judges thought the government should be
held civilly liable for the action of the police officer. In this manner the evidence
could be used and similar conduct in the future could be deterred. It would
seem that punitive damages against the governmental body hiring the officer could
further serve to prevent such police misconduct as was involved in this case and
the principal case.
The following statement has been made supporting the view of the dissenting
judges: "If in any community a substantial number of such actions become success-
ful, the financial pressure would be felt at the administrative levels where policy
is made, and pressure on the police to conform more closely to judicial standards
would doubtless follow." Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 565, 595 (1955).
'Time, Oct. 5, 1959, P. 24; The American City, Oct. 1957, P. 173 at 175.
2336 F.2d 95o (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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of the dog; (2) failing to properly train the dog; and (3) failing to
otherwise take the necessary precautions for protection of the public
against risk and harm generally to be reasonably anticipated."3 The
District answered that the dog was being used in a governmental
function, and therefore the municipality was protected by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
The United States District Court agreed and rendered summary
judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, stat-
ing that the District had a duty to take precautions against a fore-
seeable injury, irrespective of the performance of a governmental
function. The plaintiff should be allowed to present his case in order
to determine if the District had taken such reasonable precautions.
As more dogs are adopted to police use, the problem of liability
for injuries becomes increasingly important. While the public, through
the police, has an interest in the use of dogs to prevent crime, the
people also have an interest in protecting law-abiding citizens from
injuries inflicted by the dogs.
The modern use of police dogs began in Baltimore in 1956.4 There
are now i2to cities using from one to 75 dogs each. 5 Broadly conceived,
the function of these dogs is to deter crime throughout the entire
city, and not to drive it from one section of the city to another.0
The dogs are used for searching and guard duties. When search-
ing in dangerous areas of the city, the dog's keen eyesight and hearing
can be used advantageously to protect his master. 7 The United States
1Id. at 952.
"Handy, Harrington & Pittman, The K-9 Corps; The Use of Dogs in Police
Work, 52 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 328 (1961). The training of these dogs for police
duties began in 1920, with a school located at Greenheide, Germany. The idea
spread to Ghent, Belgium, which became the world leader in the training of police
dogs. The first canine corps was begun in the United States in New York in 1906.
By 191, there were 16 New York dogs patrolling Long Island. The second canine
corps in the United States started a few years later, when Glen Ridge, New Jersey,
purchased two of these dogs. The overall growth of canine corps was halted
in the United States at this time because of public dissatisfaction.
13o Municipal Year Book 418 (1963). According to this source, 30 cities are
using one dog, and 22 are using two dogs. Between three and ten dogs are used in
51 cities; between uL and 15 in eight cities; and between 16 and 75 dogs are cur-
rently being employed in nine cities. Of these, Washington, D.C., is the largest
user with about 75 dogs on the police force.
6Handy, Harrington & Pittman, supra note 3, at 336.
2The uses of police dogs in searching include such places as: wooded areas, fac-
tories, waterfront areas and docks, parks, parking lots of public arenas, theatres,
sport parks, residential areas, abandoned buildings (where the dog searches from
room to room and then from floor to floor), tenement and slum areas, construc-
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Government uses dogs to guard important installations,8 and depart-
ment stores now use them in guarding warehouses at night.9 Dogs
have been trained to track criminals and point out articles discarded
by the subject along the escape route.10 Very recently, German Shep-
herds and Doberman Pinschers have been used to control crowds,
especially race riots, and have been credited with the preventing many
injuries."
Statistics show how useful well-trained police dogs have become.
In Baltimore, dogs assisted in 175 arrests in 1957.12 The next year this
figure rose to about 500,13 and in 1959, 685 arrests were credited to
the K-9 corps.
14 These increases have been in part the result of inno-
tion sites, and schools. They are extremely useful when searching for escaped
criminals, "escape" artists, and lost persons. Handy, Harrington & Pittman, supra
note 3. These dogs can also be trained to find stolen property located either inside
or outside a house. Sloane, Dogs in War, Police Work and on Patrol, 46 J. Crim. L.,
C. & P.S. 385 (1955)-
sAt the present time there are about 5,ooo police dogs guarding U.S. Air Force
and Army bases all over the world, particularly missile sites and isolated areas. U.S.
News & World Report, Dec. 28, 1959, p. 56.
'This was begun in 1952, when Marshall Field's department store in Chicago
put dogs in its stores and warehouses at night to stand guard. The dog would
walk with the night watchman and flush out burglars and prowlers who had
hidden in the building. They were later trained to walk specific assigned patterns,
or beats, alone and press a button on the floor, located at 15 minute intervals
along the route, if everything were in order. When there was any sign of fire,
smoke, water leakage, or prowlers the button was not pressed. Also in 1952, Macy's
of New York began using Doberman Pinschers for the same type of duty and have
successfully eliminated night burglaries. Handy, Harrington &- Pittman, supra note
3; Sloane, supra note 7.
20Often police departments specifically train bloodhounds for these functions.
Chapman, Dogs in Police Work, 51-54 (Public Administration Serv. 196o). So much
faith has been placed in their ability to follow a scent that a bloodhound's "testi-
mony" can be admitted as evidence in a trial if a proper foundation has been
laid concerning the "pedigree of the dogs, their acuteness of scent, training and
experience in trailing persons under fairly-similar conditions, their reputation
for such taking the scent of human beings and following it unhesistatingly
and faithfully." 2 Alexander, The Law of Arrest, 1165 (1949). The oral statements
at the trial or written certificates, by one who knows the pedigree, registration,
and the dog's training are direct evidence and are not hearsay.
A well-trained police dog can also be extremely useful in tracking a criminal,
for he can pick up the suspect's scent left on crushed grass and even on hard sur-
faces. When fully trained, these dogs can follow this scent laid si/ hours earlier.
Handy Harrington & Pittman, supra note 3, at 332.
UThis was done in Collins Park, Delaware, where the state police brought
police dogs into a residential neighborhood to break up a race riot. After the
crowd had been dispersed, the dogs stood regular night watch with their masters to
deter any further violence. Life, March 9, 1959, p. 39.
'-Chapman, supra note so, at 38.
uSupra note i.
"'Chapman, supra note so, at 38.
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vations made by the police departments to increase the over-all effec-
tiveness of K-9 transports,
15 and Alexandria, Virginia, has experi-
mented with attaching citizen's band radio on the harness of the dogs,
so that commands can be received from several blocks away.' 6
A disadvantage of using police dogs becomes evident when an
innocent citizen is attacked by one of these dogs supposedly used for
his protection. It is extremely difficult for an injured person to re-
cover damages because the municipal owner is free to invoke the doc-
trine of governmental immunity to defeat any claim made against it.
In the Harbin case, the Court of Appeals seemed to compare the Dis-
trict of Columbia to a private individual in searching for a basis of
liability. It is the general rule that for a private owner to be liable,
the dangerous propensities of the dog must have been known by him.
This theory goes back to the common law, where the owner was finan-
cially responsible when the viciousness was such as to put him on
notice of the likelihood of harm reasonably anticipated by an ordi-
nary prudent man.' 7 Unless modified by statute, this is still the law
today.
From the common law theory two distinct bases for liability of
dog-owners have developed. Under the first, the owner or possessor is
liable on a negligence theory. This theory has been developed and
applied by the courts. The second is statutory liability, which holds
the owner absolutely liable for any damages caused by his dog.
When applying the negligence theory,' 8 the courts have used var-
ious terms to describe the same basic idea. Some courts require proof
of scienter.'9 A theory of nuisance has been another basis for impos-
ing liability on the keeper of a dog which causes a foreseeable injury to
"This has doubled the mobility of the whole K-9 Corps, while allowing each
team to remain in constant radio contact with police headquarters. The American
City, March 1962, p. 31.
"The American City, Feb. 1964, p. 28.
2
TBachman v. Clark, 128 Md. 245, 97 Atl. 44o (1916).
IsVilliams v. Moray, 74 Ind. 25 (881).
11Owen v. Hampson, 62 So. 2d 245 (Ala. 1952). Scienter, according to definition,
is knowledge or reasonable anticipation of the dog's dangerous propensity. The
law does not look to the sufficiency of the knowledge, but states that any knowl-
edge of the animal's propensity to either bite or attack, whether done in anger or in
play, is sufficient. 2 Harper & James, Torts § 14.11 (1956).
This kind of knowledge may be manifested in the dog's vicious disposition,
a desire to attack or annoy people or other animals. It may be based on knowledge
of past circumstances in which the dog has bitten or attacked; and can be inferred
from the fact that the dog is kept confined and even from its reputation in the
neighborhood. Prosser, Torts § 75 (3d ed. 1964).
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members of the community.2 0 Wilful neglect of a duty is still another
term used to describe this basis of liability.
2 1
Contributory negligence is often permitted as a defense when the
complaint alleges negligence.2 2 This was taken a step further in Nelson
v. Hansen,2 3 when the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied the com-
parative negligence statute to weigh the relative fault of each party in
finding a basis of assessing damages.
Under the absolute liability theory, imposed by statute, an owner
or possessor of a dog is liable for any damages, regardless of his knowl-
edge of the dog's dangerous propensities.2 4 The applicable District
of Columbia statute appears to impose this type of liability,25 but in
Murphy v. Preston,26 an 1887 case, the court required the allegation
and proof of scienter. Thirty-five years later this interpretation was
again considered and approved,27 and in ig6i, the interpretation
n'Turner v. Shropshire, 285 Ky. 256, 147 S.W.2d 388 (1941).
"Jones v. Carey, 9 Del. (Houst.) 214, 31 At. 976 (1891).
nSee generally 66 A.L.R.2d gi6 (1959), for a coverage of this defense. Also,
Grummel v. Decker, 294 Mich 71, 292 N.W. 562 (1940); Muller v. McKesson, 73
N.Y. 195 (1878).
'1o Wis. 2d 1o7, 102 N.W.2d 251 (ig6o). Wisconsin has a statute which im-
poses absolute liability on a dogowner. The statute allows recovery "without
proving notice to the owner or keeper of such dog or knowledge by him that his
dog was mischievous..." Wis. Stat. § 174.02 (1963). But the court felt in this case
that the comparative negligence statute was applicable because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. This is the first time this statute has been used in dog
bite cases, and states: "Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering." Wis. Stat. § 331.045 (1963).
The use of this statute is unusual in a dog bite case, but a use that will prob-
ably see greater application as comparative negligence statutes become mere preval-
ent. For a general discussion of this case see 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 673.
24This result was reached in Reid v. Nelson, 154 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1946).
The statute here involved was Fla. Stat. Ann. § 767.01 (1964). The negligence of
the dog owner was referred to but dismissed, for the statute makes the owner of
a dog absolutely liable for any damages done by it to either persons or animals.
I D.C. Code § 47-2005 (1961). This section does not mention the necessity of
proving the owner's or possessor's knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities.
The statute reads as follows: "Any person owning any dog so recorded in the
collectors office shall be liable in a civil action for any damage done by said dog
to the full amount of injury inflicted."
1616 D.C. (5 Mackey) 514 (1887). At the time of this decision, the civil liability
statute for dog owners was exactly the same as it is today. In spite of this the court
followed the common law theory of liability.
-1Bardwell v. Petty, 286 Fed. 772 (D. C. 1923). It is important to note that in
this opinion the court said the statutes of the District of Columbia passed in 1878
had been amended, but that the civil liability of dog owners was not altered in
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originally stated in 1887 was declared to be the existing law in the
District of Columbia.
28
Both of these theories allow an injured person to recover against
a private individual,29 but a different situation arises when a munici-
pal government owns the dog. The traditional defense of sovereign im-
munity protects the municipality in situations in which an officer or
employee negligently causes an injury while performing a govern-
mental function. 30 Recently, however, some courts have abrogated
this doctrine, thus permitting the injured citizen to recover against a
municipal corporation.31
The courts in the District of Columbia have expressed the desire
to eliminate this immunity, but have stated that it can only be done
by Congress.3 2 The doctrine has been limited somewhat by Congress,33
any way. From this, the court assumed that Congress knew of the Murphy v.
Preston decision, supra note 26, and the interpretation propounded there and felt
that if the statute were then left unchanged, unmodified, or unamended for a
long period of time, the interpretation given in that case by the District of Colum-
bia court was in accord with intent of Congress embodied in the statute.
OnKarlow v. Fitzgerald, 288 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. ig6i).
'A corporation can also be held liable as a dogowner. Tidal Oil Co. v. For-
cum, 189 Okla. 268, 16 P.2d 572 (1941). The liability here was based upon the
maintenance of a nuisance, and furthermore: "That corporations may be liable as
keepers and harborers of vicious dogs is well established." Id., 116 P.2d at 574.
'The origin of this doctrine is in the theory that the king can do no wrong.
Prosser, Torts § 125, at 996 (3d ed. 1964). This definition of sovereign immunity
doctrine has recently been stated in Banks v. City of Albany, 83 Ga. App. 640, 64
S.E.,d 93 (1951); and Ahrend v. Kansas City, 173 Kan. 26, 243 P.2d 1o31 (1952).
aThis trend began with the case of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.
2d i3o (Fla. 1952); Annot., 6o A.L.R.2d 1198 (1958), and affirmed in Ragans v. City
of Jacksonville, io6 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). The same decision has
been made in various other jurisdictions. Archer v. City of Cisco, 211 S.W.2d 955
(rex. Ct. Civ. App. 1948) (officer personally liable for using excessive force in mak-
ing arrest; Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 1 I8 N.W.2d 795 (1962)
(making school districts, municipal corporations, and other governmental sub-
divisions liable, and eliminating the defense of sovereign immunity subject to any
subsequent legislation); and Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d
1 (1961) (eliminating the judicial doctrine altogether for future cases).
-Calomeris v District of Columbia, 125 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1954) 226 F.2d 266
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Capital Transit Co. v. District of Columbia, 225 F.2d 38 (D.C.
Cir. 1955).
nD. C. Code, § 1-922 (1961): "Hereafter the District of Columbia shall not
assert the defense of governmental immunity in any suit at law in which a claim
is asserted against it for money only on account of damage to or loss of property
or on account of personal injury or death caused by the negligence or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the District occurring as the result of the oper-
ation by such employee, within the scope of his office or employment, of a vehicle
owned or controlled by the District: Provided, That in the case of a claim arising
out of the operation of an emergency vehicle on an emergency run the District shall
be liable only for gross negligence...."
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but is judicially applied in most circumstances in which governmental
functions are involved.3 4
In attempting to circumvent the immunity that would probably
exist,3 5 the court in the Harbin case seemed to treat the District as
a private dogowner, and thereby considered the maintenance of a
police dog a proprietary function. This theory underlies the whole
opinion and is specifically emphasized by the District's adoption of a
means "purely private in nature, for the accomplishment of a parti-
cular result."3 6
In performing a proprietary function a private means is adopted
by -the government for its own special benefit in serving the public. 3 7
Here the government is acting beyond its immunity and becomes sub-
ject to liability similar to that of an individual.38 When the nature of
the function is governmental and thereby performed for the com-
mon good of all, the immunity usually applies.3 9 Acts traditionally
performed by a municipality are also considered in making the dis-
tinction between governmental and proprietary functions.40
Even if the use of police dogs is considered as a governmental
function, there still may be a means of assessing liability for injuries
caused by these dogs. In the majority of states41 the maintenance of
a nuisance in performing a governmental function is an exception
to sovereign immunity.42 The nuisance theory has been applied to
private dog owners on the ground that the keeping of a dog known to
3Supra note 32.
IsBar v. District of Columbia, 202 F. Supp. 26o (D D.C. 1962). This was a case
involving a police dog in which the court stated, by the way of dictum, that under
the present case law the municipal owner probably would not be liable if one of
these police dogs bit an innocent person while making an arrest.
-336 F.2d at 953.
McSheridan v. City of Talladega, 243 Ala. 620, 8 So. 2d 831 (1942); City of
Houston v. Wolverton, 154 Tex. 325, 277 S.W.-2d 1o (1955).
2Reirson v. City of Minneapolis, ni8 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. 1962).
OHillis v. City of Huntsville, 274 Ala. 663, 150 So. 2d 240 (1963); Banks v.
City of Albany, supra note 3o; Walker v. City of Cedar Rapids, 251 Iowa 1032,
103 N.W.2d 727 (196o); Stouffer v. Morrison, 4o0 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378 (196o).
"HI1-ousing Authority v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J. 33o, 136 A.2d 401
(1957). Also, Cloyes v. Township of Delaware, 23 N.J. 324, 129 A.2d 1 (1957).
"This position is described in 56 A.L.R.2d 1415 (1957). The District of
Columbia adopted this majority holding in Roberson v. District of Columbia, 86
A.2d 536 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1952) (dictum).
-This principle was also given recognition in Krantz v. City of Huchinson,
165 Kan. 449, 196 P.2d 227 (1948); and Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136
P.2d 480 (1943).
The jurisdictions that do not recognize this exception ,apply the immunity to
all governmental functions. Bojko v. City of Minneapolis, 154 Minn. 167, 191 N.W.
399 (1923); Davis v. Provo City Corp., i Utah ad 237, 265 P.2d 415 (1953).
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be vicious constitutes a nuisance. Under this reasoning, a police dog
would dearly be considered a nuisance, and a means would thereby
be provided to avoid the immunity doctrine.
The District of Columbia does not have a tort claims act that would
permit the plaintiff to recover under the circumstances of the principal
case.43 There is, however, a statutory enabling provision that permits
the three District Commissioners to settle a claim against the District,
if a private individual would be prima facie liable.44 In the Harbin
case the court seems to be suggesting that a settlement of the case
under this statute would be the best result. Such a settlement would
allow an injured citizen to be compensated for his injury without
having to overcome governmental immunity.
Immunity generally exists when a municipal corporation is per-
forming a governmental function. A means must be found to avoid
this immunity and permit recovery in cases involving injuries caused
by police dogs, if a fair result is to be reached. The proprietary and
nuisance classifications provide such a means of avoiding immunity,
and open the door to possible recovery. It is submitted that the legis-
lature should take affirmative action and eliminate the sovereign
immunity doctrine, and thus avoid the necessity of resorting to such
classifications to allow recovery against the municipality.
BAXTER LEE DAVIS
'3 Douffas v. Johnson, 83 F. Supp. 664 (D.D.C. 1949). In this opinion, the court
also stated that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not have a provision to include
the District of Columbia.
"D.C. Code, § 1-902 (1961) provides in pertinent part that: "The Commissioners
of the District of Columbia are empowered to settle, in their discretion, claims
and suits, either at law or in equity, against the District of Columbia whenever
the cause of action-
"(a) Arises out of the negligence or wrongful act, either of commission or
omission, of any officer or employee of the District of Columbia for whose negli-
gence or acts the District of Columbia, if a private individual, would be liable
prima facie to respond in damages, irrespective of whether such negligence oc-
curred or such acts were done in performance of a municipal or governmental
function of said District.. .."
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